The idea that Israel may gradually seek good relations with neighboring countries, if its traditional alliance with Europe and the United States weakens deserves careful geopolitical examination. However, the relationship among Israel, Turkey and the Middle East countries is shaped by a far more complex set of strategic variables than migration policies alone can capture.
Historically, Israel’s foreign policy has combined military deterrence, alliance-building and selective diplomatic normalization. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has pursued peace agreements when doing so has enhanced its security environment. The peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994 emerged not because of changes in Western alliances, but because all parties realized strategic benefits in reducing conflict. More recently, the Abraham Accords demonstrated that normalization can occur when Israel maintains strong ties with Washington and European capitals.
A significant case is Turkey. Turkey and Israel have experienced times of cooperation and rivalry. During the 1990s, they developed a close strategic partnership based on shared security concerns, military cooperation and economic ties. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, relations became more contentious, mostly due to disagreements over Palestine and competing regional ambitions. Notwithstanding, bilateral trade has remained substantial even during periods of diplomatic tension, illustrating how economic interdependence can coexist with political disagreement.
From a realist point of view, a hypothetical weakening of Israeli-American or Israeli-European relations could encourage Israel to diversify its diplomatic partnerships. In such a scenario, Israel might place greater emphasis on regional relations, including improved ties with Turkey and the Arab states. Yet this would be driven primarily by strategic necessity rather than by Western acceptance of Muslim immigrants. Migration policies within Europe or North America influence domestic politics, but their direct effect on Israel’s regional diplomacy is limited.
A more reasonable mechanism involves shifts in the global balance of power. If Western support became less reliable, Israel would face incentives to reduce regional isolation and create alternative security arrangements. Turkey, as a major military power, a member of NATO and a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, could become an important interlocutor. However, significant obstacles would remain, including disagreements regarding Gaza, Palestinian statehood, maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and competing influence across the region.
Constructivist scholars would add that identities, historical narratives and domestic politics also shape foreign policy. Israeli and Turkish leaders must respond not only to external strategic pressures but also to public opinion and ideological constituencies. Consequently, normalization is rarely determined by a single geopolitical variable.
While a decline in Israeli reliance on Europe and the United States could increase incentives for regional reconciliation, the claim that Israel would make peace with neighboring countries primarily because Western states accept Muslim immigrants oversimplifies international politics. Relations between Turkey and Israel are more likely to evolve according to security interests, economic calculations, regional power competition and the broader transformation of the Middle Eastern strategic order. Such factors, rather than migration trends alone, will determine the future trajectory of Turkish-Israeli relations.